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Note
Striking a Balance: An Open Courts Analysis of
the Uniform Emergency Volunteer Health
Practitioners Act
Lindsey J. Hopper*
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck southeast
Louisiana and caused catastrophic damage along the Gulf
Coast.1 More than one thousand individuals lost their lives, ap-
proximately three hundred thousand homes were destroyed,
and the "wave of destruction" created serious environmental
and health hazards.2 Volunteers responded to the emergency,
but many were delayed or unable to provide much-needed med-
ical services because of "red tape" and confusion regarding the
interstate recognition of their licenses and credentials. 3
Natural disasters are increasing in intensity and frequen-
cy, 4 and concerns regarding the response to Hurricane Katrina,
* J.D. and M.P.H. Candidate 2009, University of Minnesota Law School
and University of Minnesota School of Public Health; B.S., 2006, Montana
State University. I wish to thank my family for their enthusiasm, love, and
support; Justice James C. Nelson for proposing the topic; Brent Larson for his
insightful comments; Professor Alexandra Klass for providing substantive
feedback; the board and staff of the Minnesota Law Review, and, in particular,
Jenni Vainik and Lindsey Yock for their thoughtful advice. I am also grateful
to Professor William McGeveran for his mentorship and feedback throughout
the writing of this piece. Copyright © 2008 by Lindsey J. Hopper.
1. See NOAA Home Page-Hurricane Katrina, http://www.katrina.noaa
.gov (last visited Apr. 27, 2008).
2. See FRANCES FRAGOS TOWNSEND ET AL., THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO
HURRICANE KATRINA 7-9 (2006), http://www.whitehouse.gov/reportsfkatrina
-lessons -learned.pdf.
3. See UNIF. EMERGENCY VOLUNTEER HEALTH PRACTITIONERS ACT pre-
fatory note 2-3 (2007). The model act is available upon request from the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on State Laws or on the Act's website. See
UEVHPA, UEVHPA (2007) http://www.uevhpa.org/DesktopDefault.aspx
?tabindex=l&tabid=69 (last visited Apr. 27, 2008).
4. See DANIEL A. FARBER & JIM CHEN, DISASTERS AND THE LAW: KATRI-
NA AND BEYOND 110-13 (2006) (stating that "[c]limate change, environmental
degradation, population growth, social and economic inequality, and govern-
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paired with the threat of a biological terrorist attack or an in-
fluenza pandemic, have prompted a wave of emergency-
preparedness legislation designed to facilitate a speedy and ef-
ficient response to disasters. 5 Some legislative efforts have in-
stituted civil-liability limitations in order to encourage volun-
teerism among health practitioners in times of emergencies. 6
One such effort is the Uniform Emergency Volunteer
Health Practitioners Act (UEVHPA). The National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) drafted
and approved this piece of model legislation during the summer
of 2007. 7 Colorado, Kentucky, and Tennessee have enacted the
UEVHPA,8 and many more states will consider adopting it in
2008.9 In an effort to promote volunteerism and shield volun-
teer health practitioners (VHPs) from liability, the UEVHPA
protects them from civil liability resulting from their negligent
acts or omissions. 10
This Note critiques the UEVHPA and asserts that states
should modify the civil-liability-limitation section of the
UEVHPA before adopting it. Section 11 of the UEVHPA elimi-
nates negligently injured victims' means of recovery." Many
state constitutions, however, contain "open courts provisions."
These provisions typically guarantee that injured persons have
a right to a remedy through the state's legal system.' 2 Open
courts provisions are a notoriously understudied area of state
mental policy" contribute to this trend). "Natural phenomena are likely to af-
fect more people because Earth's population has increased." Id. at 111.
5. See Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., The Law and the Public's Health: The
Foundations, in LAW IN PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE 25, 25 (Richard A. Good-
man et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007); James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., The Pandemic and
All-Hazards Preparedness Act: Improving Public Health Emergency Response,
297 JAMA 1708, 1708 (2007).
6. See, e.g., Volunteer Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14503(a) (2000).
7. See UNIF. EMERGENCY VOLUNTEER HEALTH PRACTITIONERS ACT pre-
fatory note 1. The NCCUSL provides states with model laws to clarify and
stabilize critical areas of the law. See National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, http://www.nccusl.org/Update (last visited Apr. 27,
2008).
8. See UEVHPA, Enactment Status Map, http://www.uevhpa.org/
DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=2&tabid=67 (last visited Apr. 27, 2008).
9. See id.; see also Mimi Hall, States Cutting Disaster Red Tape, USA
TODAY, Oct. 9, 2007, at 1A.
10. See UNIF. EMERGENCY VOLUNTEER HEALTH PRACTITIONERS ACT § 11.
11. See id.
12. See David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1197,
1201-02 (1992).
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constitutional law,13 yet they are found in thirty-nine state con-
stitutions. This Note develops a novel framework by which to
gauge the constitutionality of legislation that implicates open
courts provisions. By eliminating a victim's right to recover for
negligence or medical malpractice, the civil-liability-limitation
provision of the UEVHPA conflicts with a right protected by
many state constitutions. Accordingly, the UEVHPA has be-
come a subject of debate because it implicates many of the con-
cerns that accompany tort reform efforts. 14
Part I of this Note surveys emergency public health legisla-
tion and civil-liability concerns regarding the use of VHPs. It
provides a general overview of the UEVHPA and section 11, the
section that limits civil liability. Part II discusses open courts
provisions and describes the ways that state courts have inter-
preted such provisions. Part III explains the conflict between
section 11 of the UEVHPA, which prevents negligently injured
victims from obtaining redress, and open courts provisions.
Parts III and IV examine alternative solutions to those found in
section 11. Part IV proposes that states should assume liability
for the negligence of VHPs so that negligently injured victims
may obtain redress. Although there are other viable solutions,
including a victim compensation fund and a no-fault compensa-
tion scheme, a state agreement to assume liability for the neg-
ligence of VHPs strikes the optimal balance between encourag-
ing volunteerism and providing negligently injured victims a
means of recovery.
13. See Thomas R. Phillips, The Constitutional Right to a Remedy, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309, 1317-18 (2003) (noting that open courts provisions have
been virtually ignored by legal scholars).
14. Compare Letter from Kathleen Flynn Peterson, President-Elect, Am.
Assoc. for Justice, to Members of the Drafting Committee, Nat'l Conference of
Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws (Mar. 5, 2007), available at http://www.law
.upenn.edu/blllarchives/ulc/uiehsa/2007march5_aajarecs.pdf (expressing con-
cerns over civil-liability limitations), with Letter from American Academy of
Dermatology Association et al., to Raymond R. Pepe, Chair, UEVHPA Draft-
ing Comm. (June 5, 2007), available at http://www.law.upenn.edufbllarchives/
ulc/uiehsal2007june5_letter.pdf (advocating for liability limitations), and Let-
ter from Gene W. Matthews, Senior Fellow, and Anna Wood, Legal Research
Assoc., N.C. Inst. for Pub. Health, to Raymond R. Pepe, Chair, UEVHPA
Drafting Comm. (July 12, 2007), available at http://www.uevhpa.org/Uploads/
UEVHPAUNCIPHIetter_071207.pdf (suggesting that state constitutions do
not prohibit the adoption of civil-liability limitations).
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I. EMERGENCY PUBLIC HEALTH LAW
Public health involves protecting, promoting, and improv-
ing the health of communities through education and disease
prevention. 15 Accordingly, the principles of public health "rec-
ommend natural disaster preparedness and, when a disaster
has struck, early response in order to prevent and suppress
public health crises."16 Public health law, in turn, has been de-
fined as the study of the legal powers "to assure the conditions
for people to be healthy" and "the limitations on the power of
the state to constrain" individual freedoms for the common
good.1 7 Although the federal government does have a role to
play, particularly during national emergencies, public health
law is governed predominantly by state law.18
State and local authorities have "significant common law,
statutory, and constitutional authority" to respond to public
health emergencies.1 9 Such emergencies may involve man-
made problems, as well as natural problems, which often affect
the public's health on a large scale.20 Preparing for public
health emergencies is a difficult task. Although no amount of
planning can fully insulate the nation from a disaster, creating
''an appropriate legal environment" and legal infrastructure is
a crucial component of public health emergency preparedness. 21
15. See ASPH, What Is Public Health?, http://www.asph.org/document.cfm
?page=300 (last visited Apr. 27, 2008).
16. David L. Feinberg, Hurricane Katrina and the Public Health-Based
Argument for Greater Federal Involvement in Disaster Preparedness and Re-
sponse, 13 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 596, 597-98 (2006).
17. LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW 4 (2000).
18. See, e.g., id. at 41; Andrew D. Moulton et al., VWat Is Public Health
Legal Preparedness?, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 672, 675 (2003) ("Public health
traditionally has been the domain of state and local governments."); see also
Jim Rossi, State Executive Lawmaking in Crisis, 56 DUKE L.J. 237, 237-39
(2006) (discussing state authority to address interstate crises). The legal au-
thority for most public health efforts is the police power, defined as the author-
ity of state governments to enact laws that safeguard the health of their citi-
zens. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-25 (1905).
19. Daniel J. O'Brien, Strengthening the Regional Health Care System:
Legal Issues and Strategies, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 587, 589 (2006).
20. See Gene W. Matthews et al., Legal Authorities for Interventions in
Public Health Emergencies, in LAW IN PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE, supra note
5, at 262, 263.
21. James G. Hodge, Jr., Legal Triage During Public Health Emergencies
and Disasters, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 627, 628 (2006). Public health-emergency
preparedness is a new term born in the context of "potentially massive public
health emergencies." Moulton et al., supra note 18, at 673.
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A. THE PUBLIC HEALTH-EMERGENCY LAW MOVEMENT AND
VOLUNTEER HEALTH PRACTITIONERS
Dramatic public health events in the beginning of the
twenty-first century raised serious questions in the minds of
public health stakeholders 22 concerning the public health infra-
structure,23 a need for the modernization of public health sta-
tutes, 24 and emergency preparedness. 25 Although the rise of
these concerns was not a new phenomenon, 26 the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks, the 2001 anthrax attacks, the emer-
gence of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), the loom-
ing influenza pandemic, and the 2005 hurricane season spurred
federal and state governments to reassess the need for emer-
gency public health legislation. 27 In particular, the troubling
response to Hurricane Katrina 28 demonstrated that emergency
public health laws must be enacted or modified to facilitate the
joint efforts of state and local health departments, nonprofit
entities, health care providers, and federal agencies. 29
22. See Preface to the First Edition of LAW IN PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE,
supra note 5, at x (stating that public health stakeholders include "health of-
ficers, epidemiologists, public health lawyers, educators, and legislators").
23. See, e.g., John Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Katrina
Health Concerns, http://www.jhsph.edu/katrina/public-healthinfrastructure
.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2008).
24. See, e.g., MODEL STATE PUB. HEALTH ACT prefatory note (Turning
Point Pub. Health Statute Modernization Collaborative 2003), http://www
.turningpointprogram.orgPages/pdfs/statute-mod/phsm TP model state-ph_
act.pdf.
25. See Elizabeth A. Weeks, Lessons from Katrina: Response, Recovery
and the Public Health Infrastructure, 10 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 251, 253-
58 (2007) (discussing the myriad challenges arising from a single-episode cri-
sis).
26. See, e.g., INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 19 (1988).
27. See Gostin et al., supra note 5, at 25, 43; Matthews et al., supra note
20, at 262; Dorothy Puzio, An Overview of Public Health in the New Millenium
[sic]: Individual Liberty vs. Public Safety, 18 J.L. & HEALTH 173, 174 (2004);
Weeks, supra note 25, at 251. Federal plans regarding legal preparations for
public health emergencies have been incorporated into homeland security in-
itiatives. See Wendy E. Parmet, Unprepared: Why Health Law Fails to Prepare
Us for a Pandemic, 2 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 157, 191-92 (2006)
("[P]reparedness has become the watchword of the day.").
28. See, e.g., FARBER & CHEN, supra note 4, at 53 ("By most accounts, the
federal and state agencies charged with coordinating the response to Hurri-
cane Katrina performed abysmally.").
29. See Weeks, supra note 25, at 256 ("Emergency response calls for coor-
dination among different levels of federal, state, and local governments and
private actors.").
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The resulting public health emergency preparedness
movement spawned state and federal legislation to increase
emergency preparedness. 30 Several model laws were enacted to
provide a framework for facilitating the "detection, manage-
ment, and containment of public health emergencies." 31 Major
topics of interest surrounding such legislation included the li-
censing and registration of VHPs, as well as liability concerns
surrounding their use.32
Public health emergencies frequently demand the use of
VHPs to supplement the existing health care workforce.3 3 Nat-
ural disasters and other emergencies that "threaten the health
and safety of the population consistently feature the assistance
and support of VHPs."34 VHPs may include individuals from a
wide range of health professions, such as doctors, nurses,
pharmacists, and psychologists, including those from the pub-
lic, private, and nonprofit sectors. 35 In the event of a large-scale
disaster, health officials will likely need the help of VHPs from
other jurisdictions.36
30. See, e.g., Public Health Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 106-505, 114
Stat. 2314 (2000) (containing the Public Health Threats and Emergencies Act
of 2000); ASSEMBLY ON FED. ISSUES HEALTH COMM., NAT'L CONFERENCE OF
STATE LEGISLATURES, SUMMARY: PUBLIC HEALTH THREATS & EMERGENCIES
ACT (2002), http://www.ncsl.org/statefed/health/phteas.pdf.
31. Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., The Model State Emergency Health Powers
Act: Planning for and Response to Bioterrorism and Naturally Occurring Infec-
tious Diseases, 288 JAMA 622, 625 (2002). Model laws serve as tools for legis-
latures to assess preparedness and adopt legislation that implements coordi-
nated disaster and emergency responses. See id.
32. See William C. Nicholson, Preparedness for Public Health Emergen-
cies, in A LEGAL GUIDE TO HOMELAND SECURITY AND EMERGENCY MANAGE-
MENT FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 59, 59 (Ernest B. Abbott & Otto J.
Hetzel eds., 2005).
33. See James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., The Legal Framework for Meeting
Surge Capacity Through the Use of Volunteer Health Professionals During
Public Health Emergencies and Other Disasters, 22 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POLY 5, 7-8 (2005) [hereinafter Hodge, Legal Framework]; see also James G.
Hodge, Jr. et al., Risk Management in the Wake of Hurricanes and Other Dis-
asters: Hospital Civil Liability Arising from the Use of Volunteer Health Pro-
fessionals During Emergencies, 10 MICH. ST. J. MED. & L. 57, 62-64 [hereinaf-
ter Hodge, Risk Management] (discussing hospitals' need for VHPs in
emergencies).
34. Hodge, Legal Framework, supra note 33, at 8.
35. See id. at 8-9.
36. See Kenneth De Ville, Legal Preparation and Pandemic Influenza, 13
J. PUB. HEALTH MGMT. PRAC. 314, 316 (2007).
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Although VHPs play an important role in public health
emergency response,3 7 their use by private and public entities
implicates issues of civil liability. 38 In this context, civil liability
refers to the potential liability of VHPs for acts or omissions
that result in injuries to others. 39 VHPs expose themselves to
suits for intentional torts, negligence, privacy violations, and
breach of contract claims. 40
In particular, there is some concern that issues of civil lia-
bility may chill the volunteer response to public health emer-
gencies.4 1 Many public health preparedness efforts have sug-
gested that potential legal issues may hinder an effective
response to an emergency. 42 For example, although "an enorm-
ous amount of good was done by a group of people who wanted
to help" in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, some commen-
tators have argued that doctors may have hesitated to volun-
teer "out of fear of facing some kind of legal action."43 Policy-
makers realized the potential chilling effect of civil liability
upon volunteerism. 44 Accordingly, the federal government and
37. See Hodge, Legal Framework, supra note 33, at 13-14.
38. See, e.g., Interview by Office of Communications and Public Affairs,
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg Sch. of Pub. Health with James G. Hodge, Jr., As-
sociate Professor, Bloomberg Sch. Dep't of Health Policy and Mgmt. (Dec. 11,
2006), http://www.jhsph.edulpublichealthnews/articles/2006/hodgevolunteers
.html.
39. See Cheryl A. Peterson, Be Safe, Be Prepared: Emergency System for
Advance Registration of Volunteer Health Professionals in Disaster Response,
11 ONLINE J. ISSUES NURSING (2006), http://nursingworld.org/
MainMenuCategories/ANAMarketplace/ANAPeriodicals/OJIN
TableofContents/Volumell2006/Number3/tpc3l_216083.aspx.
40. See, e.g., James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., Scope of Practice for Public Health
Professionals and Volunteers, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 53, 54 (2005) ("Civil ac-
tions that may be brought against medical volunteers include negligence, in-
tentional torts, privacy violations, misrepresentation, discrimination, or
breach of contract.").
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 14501(a)(1) (2000); Kenneth De Ville, Legal Fears, Le-
gal Protections, and Responsible Behavior During Public Health Emergencies,
13 J. PUB. HEALTH MGMT. PRAC. 530, 530 (2007) ("[T]he number of volunteers
available during and after Hurricane Katrina was adversely affected by unre-
solved liability fears.").
42. See, e.g., De Ville, supra note 41, at 530; Hodge, Legal Framework, su-
pra note 33, at 10 ("[T]he use of VHPs during emergencies raises significant
legal questions that impact volunteers .... ).
43. C.W. Nevius, State Laws Become Roadblock to Medical Response in
Crisis, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 2, 2006, at A2.
44. See O'Brien, supra note 19, at 590 ("[A]pportioning risk and providing
worker protections .. may, in some measure, affect the resilience and respon-
siveness of the health care workforce.").
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many states enacted legislation limiting the potential legal lia-
bility of VHPs.45
One such example of federal legislation is the Volunteer
Protection Act of 1997 (VPA), which provides civil-liability pro-
tection for nonprofit or government volunteers if the "volunteer
was acting within the scope" of his responsibilities and area of
expertise, was properly licensed, and did not cause harm by
"willful or criminal misconduct, gross negligence, reckless mis-
conduct, or a conscious, flagrant indifference to the rights or
safety of the individual harmed by the volunteer." 46 Protection
under the VPA is not limited to medical volunteers, and it pro-
tects volunteers outside the realm of public health emergen-
cies.47 The VPA, however, may not provide coverage to VHPs
who volunteer outside their own professional practice areas.48
Thus, confusion may arise on the part of VHPs with respect to
where they may volunteer and receive some protection from
civil liability. 49
In addition, the Emergency Management Assistance Com-
pact (EMAC) permits any state to supply government person-
nel, equipment, and supplies to states experiencing a public
45. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 14503; CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.2 (West 2004);
MINN. STAT. § 604A.01 (2006); see also Health Resources and Services Admin-
istration, Emergency System for Advance Registration of Volunteer Health
Professionals, http://www.hrsa.gov/esarvhp/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2008) ("Con-
gress recognized the need to make optimum use of volunteer health personnel
in an emergency and authorized the development of an Emergency System for
Advance Registration of Health Professions Volunteers .... ). The Emergency
System for Advance Registration of Volunteer Health Professionals (ESAR-
VHP) program is composed of state-based systems that seek to provide infor-
mation about volunteers' identity and credentials, which allows states to "bet-
ter utilize health professional volunteers in emergencies." Id.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 14503. The VPA was enacted to "clarif[y] and limit[] the
liability risk assumed by volunteers" because of the "national scope of the
problems created by the legitimate fears of volunteers about frivolous, arbi-
trary, or capricious lawsuits." Id. § 14501(a)(7).
47. Cf., e.g., Kenneth W. Biedzynski, The Federal Volunteer Protection Act:
Does Congress Want to Play Ball?, 23 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 319, 325 (1999)
(discussing the VPA as applied to youth and amateur sports volunteers).
48. See RAYMOND P. PEPE, KIRKLAND & LOCKHART PRESTON GATES ELLIS
LLP, UNIFORM EMERGENCY VOLUNTEER HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS ACT 20, 41
(2007), http://www.nccusl.org/uevhpaUploads/RP-UEVHPA-sept07.ppt.
49. "Assessing potential civil liability in advance may help avoid uncer-
tainty" on the part of VHPs and hospitals that use VHPs. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., EMERGENCY SYSTEM FOR ADVANCE REGISTRATION OF VOLUN-
TEER HEALTH PROFESSIONALS-LEGAL AND REGULATORY ISSUES 41 (2006),
ftp://ftp.hrsa.govfbioterror/May_06-LegalReport.pdf.
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health emergency. 50 All fifty states have passed EMAC legisla-
tion.51 EMAC allows for licensed health practitioners employed
by state and local governments to be deployed to other jurisdic-
tions. 52 If VHPs are registered under EMAC, EMAC provides
for licensure recognition, protection from civil liability for
VHPs, and immunity for state actors.
53
While EMAC provides for licensure recognition and certain
protections from civil liability, it only applies to state and local
government employees who are recognized as state actors un-
der mutual aid agreements between states.54 Accordingly, some
VHPs may be exposed to civil liability for negligent actions and
may not be protected by EMAC or the VPA. Although states
may provide some civil-liability limitations for VHPs, coverage
varies widely by jurisdiction. 55 Therefore, model legislation is
necessary to unify the procedures used to authorize and regu-
late the deployment of VHPs in response to emergencies.
56
B. THE UNIFORM EMERGENCY VOLUNTEER HEALTH
PRACTITIONERS ACT
In response to the concerns of civil liability surrounding
the use of VHPs and in an attempt to fill the gaps left by feder-
al and disparate state legislation, the NCCUSL drafted the
UEVHPA.5 7 At least twenty states are considering adopting
legislation modeled after the UEVHPA in 2008.58 The UEVHPA
50. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-854, ENHANCING
EMAC's COLLABORATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY SHOULD IMPROVE
NATIONAL DISASTER RESPONSE 1 (2007), http://www.gao.govfhtext/d07854
.html
51. See id.
52. See DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 49, at 48.
53. See id. at 48-49.
54. See Nicholson, supra note 32, at 67.
55. For example, many states have passed "Good Samaritan" statutes
that limit a rescuer's liability for negligence. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.2
(West 2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2793 (1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-714
(2007). Although "Good Samaritan provisions provide some level of immunity
from civil liability, the applicable conditions and standards of negligence vary
widely." DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 49, at 46. Good Sama-
ritan statutes may not apply to practitioners that have a preexisting duty to
render aid and may not apply to services provided in a hospital. See id.
56. See UNIF. EMERGENCY VOLUNTEER HEALTH PRACTITIONERS ACT pre-
fatory note 2-3 (2007) (noting that during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, no
uniform system existed to link the various public and private sector programs,
which kept hundreds of volunteers from caring for survivors).
57. See id.
58. Hall, supra note 9.
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authorizes VHPs to provide services for the duration of an
emergency 59 if they are registered with a volunteer practitioner
registration system. 60 The UEVHPA defines a VHP as a health
practitioner "who provides health or veterinary services,
whether or not the practitioner receives compensation for those
services."61 Among other goals, the UEVHPA seeks to facilitate
the registration and deployment of VHPs, while regulating
their use and reducing confusion regarding the types of services
that they may provide.62 The VHPs must comply with limita-
tions on the scope of their practice and with restrictions levied
by the host state.63
To that end, section 11 of the UEVHPA, which addresses
the civil liability of VHPs and vicarious liability, provides two
alternatives for states that adopt the uniform law.64 Alternative
A states that a VHP who provides services pursuant to the
UEVHPA is "not liable for damages for an act or omission of
the practitioner in providing those services."65 A VHP may still
be found liable for willful or wanton, grossly negligent, reckless,
or criminal conduct, an intentional tort, or breach of contract.66
Alternative A also provides that "[n]o person is vicariously lia-
ble for damages for an act or omission of a volunteer health
practitioner if the practitioner is not liable for the damages un-
der subsection (a)." 67 Essentially, Alternative A states that
VHPs are not liable for damages resulting from ordinary negli-
gence, and a person is not vicariously liable for damages result-
ing from the ordinary negligence of VHPs.
Alternative B provides similar coverage for a VHP who is
not paid more than five hundred dollars per year for services
59. An emergency is initiated by a declaration pursuant to state law. See
UNIF. EMERGENCY VOLUNTEER HEALTH PRACTITIONERs ACT § 2(3). Almost all
states have instituted a legal framework for declaring a state of emergency.
See DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 49, at 24. Additionally,
some states have different procedures for declaring a public health emergency.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 381.00315 (2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-4-130 (2007).
60. See UNIF. EMERGENCY VOLUNTEER HEALTH PRACTITIONERS ACT § 5.
61. Id. § 2(15).
62. See id. prefatory note 4-5.
63. See id. at 5.
64. See id. § 11.
65. Id. § 11, Alternative A, subsec. (a), at 39.
66. Id. § 11, Alternative A, subsec. (c), at 39.
67. Id. § 11, Alternative A, subsec. (b), at 39. The UEVHPA defines "per-
son" broadly so as to include individuals, corporations, businesses, governmen-
tal agencies, and any other legal entities. Id. § 2(11).
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provided pursuant to the UEVHPA,68 thus limiting the liability
for VHPs who are "nominally compensated."69 As in Alternative
A, a VHP is not liable for "an act or omission of the practitioner
in providing those... services" that amounts to ordinary negli-
gence.7 0 Alternative B, however, makes no mention of vicarious
liability, but the fact that it "does not expressly provide immun-
ity for vicarious liability should not raise an implication that
such liability exists."71 Neither Alternative A nor Alternative B
provides a substitute remedy for victims injured by a VHP's
negligence.72
The drafters of the UEVHPA do not advocate that states
adopt one alternative over the other.73 Instead, states are in-
structed to select the alternative that best suits their needs
based on state tort law, policy considerations, and the expe-
riences of VHPs within their jurisdiction.7 4 The civil liability of
VHPs is limited under both alternatives.7 5 If VHPs respond to
an emergency in a state that has adopted the UEVHPA, they
will not be liable for ordinary negligence.
II. INTERPRETATIONS OF OPEN COURTS PROVISIONS
AND PROVIDING REDRESS TO VICTIMS
A. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS
There is "no serious question" that medical negligence oc-
curs at a significant rate.7 6 "In the United States, more people
are killed each year as a result of medical malpractice than die
in car accidents and workplace accidents combined."77 A Har-
vard University study concluded that approximately "one out of
every 100 patients" admitted to hospitals had a viable medical
malpractice claim based on negligence.78 These claims are filed
68. Id. § 11, Alternative B, subsec. (a), at 40.
69. See id. § 11 cmt. 1 at 42.
70. See id. § 11, Alternative B, subsec. (a), at 40.
71. Id. § 11 cmt. 5 at 47.
72. Cf. id. § 11.
73. Id. § 11 cmt. 1 at 42.
74. See id.
75. See id. § 11.
76. Neil Vidmar, Medical Malpractice Lawsuits: An Essay on Patient In-
terests, the Contingency Fee System, Juries, and Social Policy, 38 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1217, 1222 (2005).
77. Patrick A. Salvi, Why Medical Malpractice Caps Are Wrong, 26 N. ILL.
U. L. REV. 553, 560-61 (2006).
78. Vidmar, supra note 76, at 1220-21.
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against one in seven doctors per year,79 and account for approx-
imately eighteen percent of the total number of cases that pro-
ceed to trial every year in the United States.8 0 Nearly all medi-
cal malpractice claims are based on negligence and tort law.8 1
Victims of medical malpractice frequently suffer severe eco-
nomic and noneconomic losses.8 2 The substantial rate of negli-
gence among the general medical community indicates that pa-
tients injured through medical negligence need a mechanism to
seek compensation for their losses.8 3
Although there are no data available regarding the rate of
negligence by VHPs, there is no reason to suspect that the rate
is lower than that exhibited by the general medical community.
In fact, given the suboptimal conditions found in the aftermath
of disasters in which VHPs must dispense care,8 4 the rate of
negligence may well be higher. Notably, studies have demon-
strated that the rate of negligence among emergency care phy-
sicians is higher than the rate among the general medical
community.8 5
Further, the use of VHPs in the responses to the Septem-
ber 11, 2001 attacks8 6 and Hurricane Katrina8 7 is too recent to
have generated quantifiable data regarding the rate of negli-
gence or the incidence of malpractice claims. Individuals often
do not discover that they have been the victims of medical neg-
ligence until they seek follow-up care.8 8 Additionally, once a
79. MARK A. HALL ET AL., MEDICAL LIABILITY AND TREATMENT RELATION-
SHIPS 284 (2005).
80. David M. Studdert et al., Beyond Dead Reckoning: Measures of Medi-
cal Injury Burden, Malpractice Litigation, and Alternative Compensation Mod-
els from Utah and Colorado, 33 IND. L. REV. 1643, 1646 (2000).
81. See HALL ET AL., supra note 79, at 374 (suggesting that although the
contractual theory of liability can apply in such cases, its use is rare).
82. See Vidmar, supra note 76, at 1223-24.
83. See id. at 1220-29 (setting forth the incidence and costs of medical
negligence).
84. See, e.g., Jodie Escobedo, Volunteer Doctor's Report from Baton Rouge,
BAY AREA RADICAL HEALTH COLLECTIVE, Sept. 26, 2005, http://barhc.w2c.net/
blog/index.php?/archives/52-Volunteer-Doctors-Report-from-Baton-Rouge
.html#extended.
85. Studdert et al., supra note 80, at 1661 ("This is likely a result of the
challenging environment in the emergency department.").
86. See Weeks, supra note 25, at 257 (noting that there were "no victims
to treat, only bodies to be recovered and identified").
87. See, e.g., Christina Siderius & Janet Tu, Volunteer Doctor Likens City
to Third World, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 10, 2005, at A12.
88. Cf. David A. Berstein, Note, The Medical Injury Compensation Reform
Act (MICRA), Pharmaceutical Malpractice, and Their Detrimental Effects on a
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negligence claim is made, it usually takes between three and
six years before it is settled.8 9
B. LEGISLATIVE TORT REFORM EFFORTS
Legislative tort reform efforts, which are generally moti-
vated by concerns regarding the cost and availability of mal-
practice liability insurance, 90 are "designed to reduce the level
of tort litigation and hence minimize exposure of persons to tort
liability," but may "adversely affect those who most deserve
and need compensation."91 Medical malpractice liability has
played a significant role in the tort reform movement. 92
Because tort reform efforts have increased in recent
years, 93 litigants have attempted to use open courts provisions
of state constitutions, with varying degrees of success, to coun-
teract efforts by legislatures to modify, restrict, or eliminate
causes of action and remedies. 94 Thirty-nine state constitutions
contain open courts provisions, 95 alternatively known as "right
Little Girl, 21 WHITTIER L. REV. 259, 279 (1999) ("Modern medicine is highly
complex and technical, creating a significant lag time between the occurrence
of wrongful conduct and the date an injury is detected.").
89. Vidmar, supra note 76, at 1248.
90. F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of the "Tort Reform"
Movement, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 437, 438 (2006).
91. Jeffrey O'Connell & David F. Partlett, An America's Cup for Tort
Reform? Australia and America Compared, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 443,
448-49 (1988).
92. See Hubbard, supra note 90, at 517-20.
93. Cf. id. at 470-71 (noting that the late 1990s ushered in a new wave of
tort reforms).
94. Litigation involving open courts provisions frequently involves "work-
ers' compensation schemes, no-fault insurance plans, medical malpractice
damage caps, and product liability statutes of repose." Schuman, supra note
12, at 1199.
95. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 13; ARIz. CONST. art. 18, § 6; ARK. CONST.
art. II, § 13; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 6; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 10; DEL. CONST.
art. I, § 9; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 18; ILL. CONST. art.
I, § 12; IND. CONST. art. I, § 12; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 18; KY. CONST.
Bill of Rights, § 14; LA. CONST. art. I, § 22; ME. CONST. art. I, § 19; MD.
CONST. art. 19; MASS. CONST. art. XI; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 8; MISS. CONST.
art. III, § 24; MO. CONST. art. I, § 14; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 16; NEB. CONST.
art. I, § 13; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 14; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 18; N.D. CONST.
art. I, § 9; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 6; OR. CONST. art.
I, § 10; PA. CONST. art. I, § 11; R.I. CONST. art I, § 5; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 9;
S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 20; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 17; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13;
UTAH CONST. art. I, § 11; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 4, ch. II, § 28; W. VA. CONST.
art. III, § 17; WIS. CONST. art I, § 9; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 8. The Supreme
Court of New Mexico has recognized an implicit right of access to the courts.
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to a remedy" provisions. 96 These provisions typically guarantee
that "for injuries of a certain type, a person shall have access to
a remedy through the state's legal apparatus."97 Although some
argue that such provisions set forth a fundamental right, 98 the
United States Constitution does not contain an open courts
provision. 99 The Supreme Court has suggested that a state leg-
islature's attempt to eliminate a common law cause of action
without providing a substitute remedy would violate the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 0 0 The general
rule now, however, appears to be that "the Constitution does
not forbid the creation of new rights, or the abolition of old ones
recognized by the common law."10 1 Therefore, the balance be-
tween tort reform efforts and providing redress to individuals is
one that must be struck at the state level.
Interpretations of open courts provisions by state courts
fall into two distinct groups. First, some courts have held that
open courts provisions do not serve as substantive checks
against tort reform efforts (nonsubstantive-check courts). 102
See Richardson v. Carnegie Library Rest., Inc., 763 P.2d 1153, 1161 (N.M.
1988), overruled by Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 965 P.2d 305 (N.M. 1998).
96. See Robert S. Peck & Ned Miltenberg, Challenging the Constitutional-
ity of Tort "Reform," in 3 ATLA'S LITIGATING TORT CASES § 29.15 (Roxanne B.
Colin & Gregory S. Cusimano eds., 2003). But see Jonathan M. Hoffman, By
the Course of the Law: The Origins of the Open Courts Clause of State Consti-
tutions, 74 OR. L. REV. 1279, 1316 (1995) (suggesting that open courts provi-
sions were not intended to be remedies clauses).
97. Schuman, supra note 12, at 1201-02. This guarantee is not unique to
the American system of government. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMEN-
TARIES *140-41 (stating that seeking redress in court was a fundamental right
of Englishmen).
98. See, e.g., Moss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1, 13 (Mont. 2002)
(Nelson, J., concurring) (arguing that the right of access to the courts is a fun-
damental right).
99. See JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING IN-
DIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS, AND DEFENSES § 6.1 n.1 (3d ed. 2000). But see
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) ("The very essence of
civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the pro-
tection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury."). The most analogous
provision in the U.S. Constitution may be the Petition Clause. See U.S. CONST.
amend. I. But see Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 n.12 (2002) (dis-
tinguishing a right of access from a right to petition).
100. Cf. Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55, 62-63 (1902).
101. Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122 (1929). But see Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 88 (1978) (noting that it is unclear
whether the Due Process Clause requires that a legislatively enacted compen-
sation scheme either duplicate the remedy at common law or provide a rea-
sonable substitute remedy).
102. See, e.g., Crier v. Whitecloud, 496 So. 2d 305, 309-10 (La. 1986); Lamb
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The second group of courts has held that open courts provisions
impose substantive checks on a legislature's ability to restrict
or eliminate causes of action and remedies (substantive-check
courts).103
1. Nonsubstantive-Check Courts' Interpretations of Open
Courts Provisions
Nonsubstantive-check courts provide different rationales
for their interpretations of open courts provisions. Some courts
interpret open courts provisions as guaranteeing access to and
availability of the judicial process but not as limiting the legis-
lature's ability to modify substantive rights. 104 Other courts
have stated that open courts provisions permit the legislature
to eliminate any causes of action that are not vested.10 5 Lastly,
some courts do not recognize state constitutional limitations
upon the power of the legislature to alter or abolish common
law causes of action or remedies. 106 Ultimately, in most situa-
v. Wedgewood S. Corp., 302 S.E.2d 868, 882 (N.C. 1983); Harrison v. Schrader,
569 S.W.2d 822, 827 (Tenn. 1978).
103. See, e.g., Smith v. Dep't of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1088-89 (Fla. 1987)
(invalidating a cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases);
Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 692 (Tex. 1988) (holding that a cap on
damages in medical malpractice cases violated Texas's open courts provision);
Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 680 (Utah 1985) (stating that the
elimination of a common law remedy must be accompanied by "an effective
and reasonable alternative remedy"). "[W]e are dealing with a constitutional
right which may not be restricted simply because the legislature deems it ra-
tional to do so." Smith, 507 So. 2d at 1089.
104. See, e.g., Pinnick v. Cleary, 271 N.E.2d 592, 600 (Mass. 1971) (finding
that the open courts provision preserves procedural but not substantive
rights); Carly N. Kelly & Michelle M. Mello, Are Medical Malpractice Damage
Caps Constitutional? An Overview of State Litigation, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
515, 518 (2005) (reviewing interpretations of open courts provisions). Damage
caps or a requirement that a litigant satisfy an administrative process or un-
dergo alternative dispute resolution have been upheld under this interpreta-
tion because these requirements do not actually prevent a litigant from filing a
case in court. See, e.g., Arceo v. Tolliver, 949 So. 2d 691, 697 (Miss. 2006) ("All
that is required is a reasonable right of access to the courts-a reasonable op-
portunity to be heard."' (quoting Wayne v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 730 F.2d 392,
403 (5th Cir. 1984))); Adams v. Children's Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W.2d 898, 906
(Mo. 1992) (holding that a cap on damages does not violate the open courts
provision).
105. See, e.g., Meech v. Hillhaven W., Inc., 776 P.2d 488, 501 (Mont. 1989);
Harrison, 569 S.W.2d at 827 (explaining that the open courts doctrine is "a
mandate to the judiciary" and not "a limitation upon the legislature"). The leg-
islature "has the power to create new rights and abolish old ones so long as
they are not vested." Dunn v. Felt, 379 A.2d 1140, 1141 (Del. Super. Ct. 1977).
106. See, e.g., Crier, 496 So. 2d at 309-10 (stating that the state constitu-
tion does not restrict the legislature's ability to modify causes of action); Lamb,
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tions, nonsubstantive-check courts' interpretations of open
courts provisions provide no protection to individuals seeking
redress.
2. Substantive-Check Courts' Interpretations of Open Courts
Provisions
In other states, open courts provisions may act as a check
against tort reform. Of these, most courts interpret such provi-
sions as restricting the legislature's ability to change or elimi-
nate a common law remedy but not a statutorily created reme-
dy.10 7 Courts have reasoned that if a cause of action was
created by the legislature and not recognized at common law,
any legislative abrogation of that cause of action does not im-
plicate a constitutional right.' 08
Such courts frequently employ one of two tests to evaluate
the actions taken by the legislature. Under the first, a quid pro
quo test, 109 courts require that a legislature provide a substi-
tute remedy "to justify legislative change."'110 If a legislature
fails to do so, the law will be declared unconstitutional.' 1 ' Un-
der the second, a balancing test, 112 courts "inquire into the pub-
lic necessity for a statute that limits access to courts, or wheth-
er the statute provides plaintiffs with some replacement
remedy or 'commensurate benefit,' or both."113 Courts may re-
302 S.E.2d at 882 ("The legislature has the power to define the circumstances
under which a remedy is legally cognizable and those under which it is not.").
107. See Kelly & Mello, supra note 104, at 518 (noting that "mere modifica-
tion to an existing cause of action" is a "constitutionally-permissible legislative
act in most states"). But see Neher v. Chartier, 879 P.2d 156, 161 (Or. 1994)
("[T]he distinction between a statutory claim and a common law claim was
abandoned ... ").
108. See, e.g., Moreno v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 787 S.W.2d 348, 355 (Tex.
1990).
109. E.g., Phillips, supra note 13, at 1335.
110. Id.
111. See, e.g., Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, 23 P.3d 333, 356 (Or. 2001)
("The legislature may abolish a common-law cause of action, so long as it pro-
vides a substitute remedial process.").
112. See, e.g., Haney v. Int'l Harvester Co., 201 N.W.2d 140, 146 (Minn.
1972) (explaining that the legislature need not provide a substitute remedy if
the remedy was eliminated pursuant to a "permissible legislative objective").
113. Kelly & Mello, supra note 104, at 518-19; see Psychiatric Assocs. v.
Siegel, 610 So. 2d 419, 424 (Fla. 1992) ("[Tlhe legislature may abrogate or re-
strict a person's access to the courts if it provides: 1) a reasonable alternative
remedy or commensurate benefit, or 2) a showing of an overpowering public
necessity for the abolishment of the right, and finds that there is no alterna-
tive method of meeting such public necessity."); Strahler v. St. Luke's Hosp.,
706 S.W.2d 7, 11-12 (Mo. 1986) (en banc) (declaring a medical malpractice
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quire a substantially equal alternative to the cause of action or
remedy modified or eliminated by the legislature, unless the
legislature acted in response to overwhelming or overpowering
public necessity. 114 The legislature must provide evidence that
tort reform is necessary in order to demonstrate that over-
whelming public need exists. 115 For example, when the Florida
legislature abolished the cause of action for alienation of affec-
tions, it justified its actions by demonstrating that the cause of
action had become "an instrument of extortion and black-
mail." 116 This satisfied the overwhelming public necessity re-
quirement. 117
Unfortunately, confusion concerning the scope of open
courts provisions has produced widely disparate state court in-
terpretations. 118 Further, courts have failed to consistently ap-
ply the open courts provision within their own jurisdiction. 119
This confusion raises the question of how state legislatures
should balance tort reform efforts that encourage volunteerism
among health practitioners with the need to provide negligently
injured victims with redress.
This Note examines the civil-liability limitations set forth
by section 11 of the UEVHPA under the most common open
courts tests and demonstrates that some enacting state legisla-
tures will need to modify section 11 in order for the UEVHPA
to survive constitutional challenges based on open courts provi-
sions. Considering the demands of open courts provisions and
general policy considerations, this Note argues that states
should consider adopting an option different from the two al-
ternatives presented by the UEVHPA in section 11 to encour-
age VHPs to respond to a public health emergency. The alter-
natives, which include the state assuming liability for the
negligence of VHPs, limit the civil liability of VHPs yet still
provide negligently injured victims with a means of recovery.
statute of repose unconstitutional because the cost outweighed the social bene-
fit).
114. See, e.g., Siegel, 610 So. 2d at 424 (discussing a showing of overwhelm-
ing public necessity).
115. See Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 4-5 (Fla. 1973).
116. Rotwein v. Gersten, 36 So. 2d 419, 421 (Fla. 1948) (en banc).
117. See id.
118. E.g., Kelly & Mello, supra note 104, at 518.
119. See, e.g., Hale v. Port of Portland, 783 P.2d 506, 518 (Or. 1989) (Linde,
J., concurring) ("This court has written many individually tenable but incon-
sistent opinions about the remedy clause .... "), overruled by Smothers v. Gre-
sham Transfer, Inc., 23 P.3d 333 (Or. 2001).
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III. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN ENCOURAGING
VOLUNTEERISM AMONG HEALTH PRACTITIONERS AND
PROVIDING VICTIMS A MEANS OF OBTAINING REDRESS
Because courts interpret open courts provisions in dispa-
rate ways, the lack of a substitute remedy for negligently in-
jured victims in section 11 of the UEVHPA may render it un-
constitutional without modification in some states. Subsequent
Sections of this Note address the constitutionality of section 11
of the UEVHPA pursuant to the ways that courts have inter-
preted open courts provisions. Considering the demands of open
courts provisions and general policy considerations, this Note
argues that states should consider adopting an option different
from the two alternatives presented by the UEVHPA in section
11 to encourage VHPs to respond to a public health emergency.
A. SECTION 11 OF THE UEVHPA Is LIKELY CONSTITUTIONAL AS
WRITTEN IF INTERPRETED BY NONSUBSTANTIVE-CHECK COURTS
In states where courts construe open courts provisions to
preserve only procedural rights, not substantive rights, 120 the
UEVHPA almost certainly would be found constitutional. Leg-
islation that endeavors to impact procedural rights is "aimed at
some characteristic of the litigation process itself, regardless of
its substantive content.121 For example, in these states, plain-
tiffs may base attacks against statutes of limitations or sta-
tutes of repose on provisions because such legislation impacts
procedural rights. 122 Section 11, however, does not limit proce-
dural rights. 123 Additionally, although some commentators
have likened an open courts analysis to a due process analy-
sis,124 section 11 does not implicate traditional due process con-
cerns like fair notice and "arbitrary deprivation of property."125
Since section 11 does not create procedural limitations on judi-
cial access, nonsubstantive-check courts would probably declare
it constitutional.
120. See, e.g., Pinnick v. Cleary, 271 N.E.2d 592, 600 (Mass. 1971); Kelly &
Mello, supra note 104, at 518.
121. Schuman, supra note 12, at 1203.
122. Id.
123. See UNIF. EMERGENCY VOLUNTEER HEALTH PRACTITIONERS ACT § 11
(2007).
124. Cf., e.g., Saultz v. Funk, 410 N.E.2d 1275, 1281 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979).
125. See Mark Geistfeld, Constitutional Tort Reform, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1093, 1103 (2005).
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Courts that construe open courts provisions as permitting
the legislature to eliminate any causes of action that are not
vested 126 would also likely find section 11 constitutional. A
cause of action is not vested "until injury actually occurs."127
Assuming that a legislature passed the UEVHPA before an
emergency situation involving the use of VHPs arose, section
11 would not violate the open courts provision because individ-
uals would not be exposed to the negligence of VHPs before the
passage of the UEVHPA.
Finally, section 11 of the UEVHPA would almost certainly
be constitutional in those states whose courts recognize no con-
stitutional limitation upon the legislative power to alter or ab-
olish causes of action or remedies based on open courts provi-
sions. 128 Subsequent Sections of this Note, however, argue that
section 11 is likely unconstitutional in substantive-check
courts. Additionally, this Note highlights some of the policy
concerns implicated by eliminating a victim's right to recover
for negligence. It maintains that other alternatives exist to en-
courage volunteerism, limit the liability of VHPs, and provide
victims with a means of obtaining redress.
B. SECTION 11 OF THE UEVHPA Is LIKELY UNCONSTITUTIONAL
IN SUBSTANTIVE-CHECK COURTS
In order to ascertain whether section 11 violates open
courts provisions as interpreted by substantive-check courts,
one must first ask whether the civil-liability limitations impli-
cate a common law cause of action. It is virtually undisputed
that "victims of medical negligence have a well-defined common
law cause of action to sue for injuries" inflicted upon them as a
result of negligent acts or omissions. 129 Medical malpractice lit-
igation has its roots in early English and American law.1 30 It is
a common law cause of action grounded in tort law.13' The law
126. See, e.g., Harrison v. Schrader, 569 S.W.2d 822, 827 (Tenn. 1978).
127. Mathis v. Eli Lilly & Co., 719 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1983).
128. See, e.g., Crier v. Whitecloud, 496 So. 2d 305, 309-10 (La. 1986).
129. Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 690 (Tex. 1988); see also Best
v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1072 (Ill. 1997).
130. See Allan H. McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12
VAND. L. REV. 549, 550 (1959) (noting that the first recorded cases of medical
malpractice date to 1374). The earliest recorded American case is Cross v. Gu-
thery, 1 Am. Dec. 61 (1794), in which a husband sued a surgeon for damages
caused by an unskillful operation on his wife.
131. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965) ("[Olne who un-
dertakes to render services in the practice of a profession or trade is required
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of negligence forms the basis for medical malpractice suits,132
and the civil liability of health care providers, including VHPs,
"is governed by general negligence principles." 13 3 In order for a
plaintiff to recover against a medical practitioner for negli-
gence, the plaintiff must prove that the practitioner owed a du-
ty to the plaintiff, that the practitioner breached that duty, that
the breach caused an injury to the plaintiff, and that the plain-
tiff suffered damages.13 4 Negligence liability may arise from ei-
ther action or inaction, if either fails to meet the standard of
care.
135
Section 11 of the UEVHPA eliminates a victim's ability to
sue a VHP for a negligent act or omission.136 Alternative A of
section 11 also bars a victim from recovering from a VHP's host
agency or the state through vicarious liability.1 3 7 Because the
UEVHPA eliminates a victim's right to sue for negligence, the
UEVHPA implicates the right to recover under a common law
cause of action.1 38 Therefore, substantive-check courts would
likely hold that section 11 of the UEVHPA triggers an open
courts provision analysis. This Note evaluates section 11 under
the two tests that substantive-check courts most frequently
employ.
to exercise the skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of that
profession or trade.").
132. See Theodore Silver, One Hundred Years of Harmful Error: The His-
torical Jurisprudence of Medical Malpractice, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1193, 1193.
133. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 264 (2000).
134. Cf. Frank A. Sloan, Setting the Stage, in FRANK A. SLOAN ET AL.,
SUING FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 1, 5-6 (1993) (discussing the differences
and similarities between medical malpractice and other forms of liability).
135. See FRANK P. GRAD, THE PUBLIC HEALTH LAW MANUAL 270 (3d ed.
2005).
136. See UNIF. EMERGENCY VOLUNTEER HEALTH PRACTITIONERS ACT § 11
(2007).
137. See id.
138. Cf. Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 690 (Tex. 1988) (holding
that a statutory limitation on medical malpractice damages violated open
courts provision of the Texas Constitution where medical negligence was a
well-defined common law cause of action and the litigant was able to show
that the restriction was "unreasonable or arbitrary when balanced against the
purpose and basis of the statute"); see also Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689
N.E.2d 1057, 1072 (Ill. 1997) ("[T]he right to recover for injuries arising from
medical malpractice existed at common law.").
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1. Section 11 of the UEVHPA Is Likely Unconstitutional
Under a Quid Pro Quo Test
When analyzing a claim under open courts provisions,
courts employing a quid pro quo test must first determine
whether the common law recognized a cause of action for the
alleged injury. 139 As stated above, at common law, individuals
had a cause of action to sue if they were negligently injured by
health care practitioners. 140 Therefore, if a state legislature
adopts the UEVHPA in its model form, it eliminates a negli-
gently injured victim's right to recover under the common law
cause of action of negligence. Under a quid pro quo test, courts
then ask whether the legislature provided a "constitutionally
adequate substitute remedy" in place of the abolished cause of
action.141 Despite the fact that the UEVHPA eliminates a neg-
ligently injured victim's right to recover against a VHP, it does
not propose a substitute remedy.142 For instance, it does not
suggest that states consider adopting a remedial process to
provide redress to negligently injured individuals. 143
The comments to section 11 indicate that the drafters be-
lieved that by adopting civil-liability limitations for VHPs,
emergency medical services would be "more readily availa-
ble."'144 Although section 11 might prompt a larger response by
VHPs, the greater availability of medical care does not serve as
a substitute for a cause of action for negligence. It does not
compensate victims or provide them with a means of obtaining
redress.
Therefore, under the quid pro quo test, section 11 of the
UEVHPA is almost certainly unconstitutional. Enacting legis-
latures, however, could modify section 11 and insert their own
substitute alternative remedy. Alternatives that limit the lia-
bility of VHPs for negligence and, accordingly, encourage vol-
139. See, e.g., Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 23 P.3d 333, 356 (Or.
2001).
140. See, e.g., Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 690; see also Taylor Mach. Works, 689
N.E.2d at 1072.
141. Smothers, 23 P.3d at 356-57.
142. Cf. UNIF. EMERGENCY VOLUNTEER HEALTH PRACTITIONERS ACT § 11.
143. The workers' compensation system is one example of a remedial
process. It substitutes recovery from a fund for the common law cause of action
of negligence against an employer for work-related injuries. See MARK A.
ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 405-06 (1994).
144. See UNIF. EMERGENCY VOLUNTEER HEALTH PRACTITIONERS ACT § 11
cmt. 2 at 43.
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unteerism, yet still make a means of redress available to negli-
gently injured victims, are set forth below.
2. Section 11 of the UEVHPA Is Likely Unconstitutional
Under a Balancing Test
The UEVHPA does not propose any alternatives, let alone
reasonable alternatives, to provide redress for injuries. 145
Therefore, in order for section 11 to pass constitutional muster
under the balancing test, the legislature must demonstrate
that an overpowering public necessity prompted the passage of
this legislation and that no reasonable alternatives exist that
would meet the necessity and provide negligently injured vic-
tims with a remedy. 146
a. No Overwhelming Public Necessity Justifies Barring
Recovery for an Individual Negligently Injured by a VHP
One stated purpose of the UEVHPA is "to establish a ro-
bust and redundant system to quickly and efficiently facilitate
the deployment and use of licensed practitioners to provide
health and veterinary services in response to declared emer-
gencies." 147 While promoting volunteerism is a laudable goal,
limiting the civil liability of VHPs by eliminating a negligently
injured victim's mean of recovery is not an overwhelming public
necessity.
Some proponents of the UEVHPA claim that unless civil-
liability limitations are put in place to protect VHPs, "the coun-
try runs the very real risk that there will not be sufficient
healthcare volunteers to provide the necessary medically-
related care" in the event of an emergency.1 4s Reports suggest,
however, that the volunteer response to Hurricane Katrina was
overwhelming. 149 Indeed, the drafters of the UEVHPA noted
145. Cf. id. § 11.
146. E.g. Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 4-5 (Fla. 1973).
147. See UNIF. EMERGENCY VOLUNTEER HEALTH PRACTITIONERS ACT pre-
fatory note 1.
148. Letter from William F. Causey, Assistant Gen. Counsel, Am. Red
Cross, and Gene W. Matthews, Senior Fellow, N.C. Inst. for Pub. Health, to
Raymond R. Pepe, Chair, UEVHPA Drafting Comm. (July 11, 2007), available
at http://www.uevhpa.org/Uploads/UEVHPACuaseyMatthewComments_
07110.pdf.
149. See, e.g., Hodge, supra note 21, at 633 (stating that "[flortunately, vo-
lunteer health personnel were available" to respond to Hurricane Katrina);
Marilynn Marchione, Red Tape Delays Volunteer Doctors, SEATTLE TIMES,
Sept. 5, 2005, at A9.
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that data was unavailable to determine "the actual impact of
liability concerns upon rates of volunteerism" in response to
Hurricane Katrina. 150 Individuals responded from around the
country to provide much-needed services. 151 Although some
may have hesitated to help for fear of being sued, 15 2 many
VHPs responded to the emergency but were prevented from
rendering emergency medical services because of uncertainty
regarding licensure and registration requirements. 153 Addition-
ally, some health practitioners wanted to respond but were not
deployed because of coordination problems. 154 Medical schools
attempted to send volunteers to the Gulf Coast, but the federal
government failed to utilize their proffered contributions. 155
Their reports suggested that barriers posed by bureaucracy and
failed communication, not concerns regarding the civil liability
of VHPs, 156 hampered the volunteer response.
Second, despite the fact that the emergency-care chal-
lenges posed by Hurricane Katrina in large part instigated the
drafting of the UEVHPA, the media has not widely reported ac-
counts of VHPs being sued for negligence in the context of pro-
viding emergency medical services to the hurricane victims. 1 57
Although plaintiffs have filed a cascade of lawsuits against in-
surance companies in connection with property damage caused
by the hurricane,158 relatively few suits have been filed against
150. UNIF. EMERGENCY VOLUNTEER HEALTH PRACTITIONERS ACT prefatory
note 7.
151. See Crystal Franco et al., Systemic Collapse: Medical Care in the Af-
termath of Hurricane Katrina, 4 BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM 135, 135
(2006); Season Cooley, First-Time Volunteer Calls Experience 'Above Expecta-
tions," AM. RED CROSS NEWS, Sept. 28, 2005, http://www.redcross.org/
article/0, 1072,0_272_4673,00.html.
152. Nevius, supra note 43; see also Interview with James G. Hodge, Jr.,
supra note 38 (stating that VHPs "want to know if they will be held personally
responsible if something goes wrong while providing emergency aid").
153. See Marchione, supra note 149 (noting that some offers of help were
turned away due to red tape and bureaucracy).
154. Franco et al., supra note 151, at 139.
155. See id. at 140.
156. The UEVHPA provides, at best, anecdotal evidence that concerns re-
garding civil liability hampered the volunteer response. See UNIF. EMERGENCY
VOLUNTEER HEALTH PRACTITIONERS ACT prefatory note 6-7 (2007).
157. In a rare case, a doctor and two nurses were arrested in connection
with the deaths of elderly patients in the aftermath of the hurricane. Rick Jer-
vis, Charges Against La. Doctor Dropped, USA TODAY, July 25, 2007, at 3A.
The UEVHPA would not have afforded them protection because it only limits
the civil liability of VHPs, not regular hospital staff. See UNIF. EMERGENCY
VOLUNTEER HEALTH PRACTITIONERS ACT § 11.
158. See, e.g., Laura Parker, After Katrina, Courts Flooded by Lawsuits,
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health practitioners. Notably, the drafters of the UEVHPA de-
termined that data are not available to determine "whether
and to what extent volunteer health practitioners have actually
been subject to liability claims."1 59 Most of the hurricane-
related wrongful-death suits that have been filed named only
hospitals, 160 nursing homes, 161 and corporations as defen-
dants, 162 not individual VHPs. Most of these claims are
grounded in alleged corporate negligence and a failure to eva-
cuate and provide transportation.1 63 In fact, the most highly
publicized account of alleged negligence implicates caregivers,
not VHPs.164
Third, many of the concerns voiced about the use of VHPs
in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina revolved around licens-
ing and registration issues, not civil-liability issues.1 65 Many
volunteers were already registered through the Emergency
System for Advanced Registration of VHPs program.1 66 Never-
theless, in an attempt to encourage volunteerism, the U.S. De-
partment of Health and Human Services (HHS) created a reg-
istration website, which confused some VHPs. 167 Other
websites were established to facilitate registration and licen-
sure verification, but VHPs were delayed while HHS verified
USA TODAY, Jan. 15, 2006, at iA.
159. UNIF. EMERGENCY VOLUNTEER HEALTH PRACTITIONERS ACT prefatory
note 7.
160. See, e.g., Preston v. Tenet Healthsys. Mem'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 F.3d
793 (5th Cir. 2007); Vucinovich v. Chalmette Med. Ctr., Inc., No. 06-7371,
2007 WL 2710830 (E.D. La. Sept. 12, 2007).
161. See Peter Whoriskey, Nursing Home Owners Acquitted in Katrina
Deaths, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2007, at A3.
162. See, e.g., Preston, 485 F.3d 793; Vucinovich, 2007 WL 2710830; La-
Coste v. Pendleton Methodist Hosp., 966 So. 2d 519 (La. 2007).
163. See Louisiana Hurricane Katrina Wrongful Death Lawsuit Not Consi-
dered Medical Malpractice Case, USLEGAL REP., Sept. 7, 2007, http://reporter
.uslegal.com/category/wrongful-death/. Corporate negligence is a theory "based
on the assumption that hospitals are responsible for the general care and
treatment of their patients." Hodge, Risk Management, supra note 33, at 70.
164. See Shaila Dewan & Al Baker, Owners of Nursing Home Charged in
Deaths of 34, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2005, at Al.
165. See Nevius, supra note 43.
166. Franco et al., supra note 151, at 140.
167. See id.
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their credentials. 168 The UEVHPA resolves these licensing and
registration issues. 16 9
In sum, while it is important to encourage volunteerism
and a speedy and efficient response to emergency situations,
concerns regarding the potential civil liability of VHPs do not
rise to the level of overwhelming public necessity that would
justify eliminating a negligently injured victim's means of re-
covery. While "[v]irtually all public health action in any context
burdens some individual or group of individuals,"170 state legis-
latures should seek to strike a balance by enacting legislation
that both limits the civil liability of VHPs and minimizes the
burden placed on negligently injured victims.
The subsequent Section of this Note explains that tort
reform efforts that eliminate a means of recovery for negligent-
ly injured victims likely have a disproportionate, undesirable
impact on vulnerable populations. Even if overwhelming public
necessity exists, legislatures should be aware of the potential
negative implications of eliminating an injured victim's right to
recover for negligence.
b. Legislatures Should Enact the UEVHPA with Significant
Changes to Section 11
Disasters affect entire communities, but certain demo-
graphic groups bear a disproportionate share of the burden. 171
For instance, race and class served as reliable indicators for
who suffered most of the devastating effects of Hurricane Ka-
trina. 172 In particular, disasters "disproportionately hit" the
poor.173 When Hurricane Katrina struck, most of the people left
behind in New Orleans were poor, black individuals who lacked
transportation to leave the city. 174 Those who are most vulner-
168. Cf. HHS to Seek Hospitals' Help in Staffing Emergency Medical Cen-
ters, AHA NEWS, Sept. 30, 2005, http://www.ahanews.comahanews-app/
hospitalconnect/searchlarticle.jsp?dcrpath=AHANEWSAHANewsNowArticle/
datalann_050831_HHS&domain=AHANEWS.
169. See UNIF. EMERGENCY VOLUNTEER HEALTH PRACTITIONERS ACT § 5
(2007).
170. De Ville, supra note 36, at 317.
171. See FARBER & CHEN, supra note 4, at 109-10.
172. CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, AN UNNATURAL DISASTER: THE AF-
TERMATH OF HURRICANE KATRINA 34-35 (2005), http://www.progressivereform
.org/UnnaturalDisaster_512.pdf.
173. FARBER & CHEN, supra note 4, at 112; see also Jonathan Alter, The
Other America, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 19, 2005, at 42.
174. See WALTER M. BRASCH, 'UNACCEPTABLE': THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO
HURRICANE KATRINA 13, 50 (2006); Jason DeParle, What Happens to a Race
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able-that is, least able to prepare for and recover from a natu-
ral disaster-are most at risk for devastating injury to life and
limb. 175 Additionally, over sixty percent of the bodies recovered
after Hurricane Katrina were individuals over sixty years old
and many were found in nursing homes and hospitals. 176
Those vulnerable individuals are, accordingly, more likely
to be negligently injured while receiving care from a VHP be-
cause they are more likely to need the services of VHPs. Legis-
lation that shapes "public health policy and practice should
never occur without careful consideration of the burden such
policies would have for the rights of individuals."'' 77 State legis-
latures should consider whether eliminating a right to recover
for negligence is a prudent option, in light of what is known
about social vulnerability and natural disasters. In this case,
public policy concerns are particularly compelling because oth-
er alternatives exist to encourage volunteerism, protect VHPs
from negligence liability, and provide redress for victims.
Although encouraging volunteerism among health practi-
tioners may benefit the health of a community impacted by a
disaster or emergency, limiting a negligently injured victim's
means of recovery adversely affects the individual and the
community. 178 Unless they have a means of obtaining redress,
victims will likely require increased economic and medical sup-
port from their communities.1 79 Because opportunities exist to
lessen the negative impacts on public health and meet the
needs of VHPs, legislatures in both substantive-check and non-
substantive-check states should carefully consider the alterna-
tives set forth below in the solution Section.
Further, because state courts interpret open courts provi-
sions inconsistently and in disparate ways, state legislatures
may be unsure about the approach their courts will take to eva-
luate section 11. It is sound public policy to promote volunteer-
Deferred, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2005, § 4, at 1.
175. See BRASCH, supra note 174, at 36.
176. See Robert A. Mead, St. Rita's and Lost Causes: Improving Nursing
Home Emergency Preparedness, 7 MARQ. ELDER'S ADVISOR 153, 154 (2006).
177. Ronald Bayer, Tom Stoddard, Public Health, and Civil Liberties: A
Remembrance, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1034, 1036 (1997).
178. See GOSTIN, supra note 17, at 12 ("A direct relationship exists between
the health of each individual and the health of the community at large. After
all, the well-being of the whole may be accomplished by little more than assur-
ing the health of each individual.").
179. Cf. John G. Culhane, Tort, Compensation, and Two Kinds of Justice,
55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1027, 1064-68 (2003) (explaining social disparities and
distributive justice).
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ism among VHPs. As set forth below, however, both the need to
encourage volunteerism and the need to offer negligently in-
jured victims a means of recovery may be accommodated.
c. Even if Overwhelming Public Necessity Exists, Alternative
Methods Exist to Meet Such Necessity
This Note sets forth and examines three alternative solu-
tions that limit the civil liability of VHPs yet still provide neg-
ligently injured victims with a means of recovery. Each option
could serve as an alternative to the options set forth in section
11 for states adopting the UEVHPA. Because the UEVHPA is a
model act designed to be adopted by state legislatures, these
proposed alternatives are directed towards policymakers re-
sponsible for drafting state legislation based on the UEVHPA.
This Note suggests that although each alternative is viable, the
third alternative-state assumption of liability for the negli-
gence of VHPs-is the most attractive option available to state
legislatures seeking to balance the needs of victims and VHPs.
i. Limited Recovery Under a Victim Compensation Fund
Some commentators have proposed that victims of public
health disasters such as Hurricane Katrina and the Minneapo-
lis 1-35 bridge collapse be compensated through the administra-
tion of victim compensation funds.18 0 One example of such a
fund is the September 11, 2001 Victim Compensation Fund (the
Fund), which Congress established to "provide compensation to
any individual (or relatives of a deceased individual) who was
physically injured or killed as a result of the terrorist-related
aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001."181 Initial plans for the
Fund capped recovery for victims at the amount of liability in-
surance held by the airlines. Some members of Congress, how-
ever, argued that "Congress could not limit the rights of the
victims without providing an alternative remedy."18 2 In its final
form, the Fund dispensed substantial damages to victims
180. Pam Louwagie, How Should State Help Rebuild Lives?, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis, Minn.), Oct. 26, 2007, at Al; Jennifer Barrett, A Right to Re-
build,' NEWSWEEK, Jan. 13, 2006, http://www.newsweek.com/id/47297/page/l.
181. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No.
107-42, § 403, 115 Stat. 230, 237 (2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
§ 40101 (Supp. II 2002)). See generally Robert M. Ackerman, The September
11th Victim Compensation Fund: An Effective Administrative Response to Na-
tional Tragedy, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 135 (2005).
182. Ackerman, supra note 181, at 143 (emphasis added).
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through a speedy, no-fault administrative compensation
process. 183
Individuals who suffered physical harm or death and fami-
lies of those who died were eligible for compensation.1 8 4 Fund
claimants waived the right to sue "for injuries sustained in the
September 11th tragedy." 18 5 Ninety-seven percent of "those eli-
gible to file death claims with the Fund" chose to do so.' 8 6 Vic-
tims who presented claims to the Fund in a timely fashion and
followed procedures were virtually assured some means of re-
covery. 187 Individuals who attempted to pursue a remedy in the
courts may not fare as well.18 8
Although there are benefits to allowing limited recovery
under a no-fault fund, some commentators maintained that the
Fund involved a backdoor effort at tort reform because it was
constructed to curtail litigation. 189 The Fund was also criticized
because it did not provide a mechanism for review of determi-
nations or awards made by the Fund administrator. 190
Even though the Fund appears to have worked relatively
well, as evidenced by the high rate of participation, 191 Congress
is unlikely to institute a fund to provide compensation for vic-
tims of disasters and public health emergencies.1 92 Although
some commentators have suggested otherwise and maintained
that the Fund could be used as a model for future
disaster relief,1 93 the Fund was the product of unique circums-
183. Id. at 144.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 145.
186. Id. at 137.
187. See Daniel A. Farber, Basic Compensation for Victims of Climate
Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1605, 1617-18 (2007) (describing the Special Mas-
ter's strategy of approximating tort remedies in the administration of the
Fund).
188. Individual plaintiffs "(assuming that they can recover in tort) will
have to share that coverage with other claimants, including personal injury
victims not eligible for relief from the Fund." Ackerman, supra note 181, at
190.
189. See, e.g., A. David E. Balahadia, Note, Preparations for a Storm: A
Proposal for Managing the Litigation Stemming from September 11th, 2001, 4
PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.F. 61, 66-67 (2003).
190. See Ackerman, supra note 181, at 138-39.
191. See id. at 137.
192. See KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH? 178 (2005) ("(I]t
would be a mistake for Congress or the public to take the 9/11 fund as a
precedent for similar programs.").
193. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, The Future of Tort Reform: Possible Les-
sons from the World Trade Center Victim Compensation Fund, 53 EMORY L.J.
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tances. 194 Unlike the relatively rare instances of terrorism on
American soil, natural disasters are increasing in intensity and
frequency,1 95 and Congress may be unwilling to operate a fund
on a large scale. This view is strengthened by the fact that
Congress has not even compensated other victims of terrorism,
such as those who were injured or killed in the Oklahoma City
bombing, the attacks against the USS Cole, or the African Em-
bassy bombings. 196 Furthermore, unlike the September 11 at-
tacks, Hurricane Katrina and other natural disasters are, to
some extent, acts of nature that may not be attributable to for-
eign attackers or actions taken by the United States govern-
ment.197 Therefore, states cannot rely on Congress to establish
a fund that would compensate victims of public health disas-
ters. Additionally, because the UEVHPA is model legislation
that can only be adopted by individual states and not Congress,
state legislatures will need to consider how to create and admi-
nister funds at the state level.
A victim compensation fund created at the state level may
be difficult to administer to compensate solely those individuals
who are negligently injured by VHPs and not all victims of pub-
lic health disasters or emergencies. Victim compensation funds
are well suited to dispensing compensation to large groups of
people and awarding funds based solely on the presence of any
injury.1 98 Conversely, the administration of hypothetical state
compensation funds will be hampered if the fund administrator
has to make distinctions between injuries incurred as a result
of a disaster and injuries incurred as a result of negligence by
VHPs. 199
1315, 1317-18 (2004).
194. Robert S. Peck, The Victim Compensation Fund: Born from a Unique
Confluence of Events Not Likely to Be Duplicated, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 209, 210
(2003).
195. FARBER & CHEN, supra note 4, at 113.
196. See Dick Meyer, Fairness Where There Is None, CBS NEWS, Jan. 10,
2002, http://www.cbsnews.comlstories/2002/O1/10/politics/main323956.shtml.
197. See Faith J. Jackson, A Streetcar Named Negligence in a City Called
New Orleans-A Duty Owed, a Duty Breached, a Sovereign Shield, 31 T. MAR-
SHALL L. REV. 557, 558 (2006). But see TED STEINBERG, ACTS OF GOD: THE
UNNATURAL HISTORY OF NATURAL DISASTER IN AMERICA 97-115 (2000) (ar-
guing that the federal government plays a role in natural disasters by encour-
aging people to build homes in disaster-prone areas like floodplains).
198. See Farber, supra note 187, at 1618 (suggesting that the Fund worked
well because "screening claimants was not a major problem").
199. Cf. Ackerman, supra note 181, at 161 (noting the difficulty of distin-
guishing between victims suffering from exposure to toxic dust and those who
suffered "more immediate non-fatal injuries" after September 11th).
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Therefore, a state that chooses to create a victim compen-
sation fund would likely be forced to compensate all victims of
disasters and public health emergencies. State legislatures
would have to consider who would contribute to the fund,
whether it would be funded by taxpayer dollars or funds from
insurance companies, and how it would be administered. This
is no small task. Accordingly, while a victim compensation fund
is one option available to state legislatures seeking to limit the
civil liability of VHPs in order to encourage volunteerism and
still provide negligently injured victims a means of recovery, it
may not be the most viable option.
ii. A No-Fault Compensation Scheme Administered
Through a Special Court
No-fault compensation schemes have sparked the interest
of those who advocate for alternatives to tort litigation. 20 0 Some
states have implemented these schemes in order to partially
supplant existing tort law.201 By "turning the focus away from
causation," no-fault compensation schemes "make compensa-
tion more predictable and limit the effects of arbitrary or sub-
jective decision-making" on the award of funds.202 The most
well-known example of a no-fault compensation scheme is the
workers' compensation system.203 The system compensates em-
ployees who are injured in the scope of their employment and
protects employers from liability through a no-fault system. 20 4
200. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance Liebman, Private Insurance,
Social Insurance, and Tort Reform: Toward a New Vision of Compensation for
Illness and Injury, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 75 n.1 (1993) (citing Jeffrey
O'Connell, Neo-No-Fault: A Fair Exchange Proposal for Tort Reform, in NEW
DIRECTIONS IN LIABILITY LAW 186, 188-89 (Walter Olson ed., 1988)).
201. For example, Florida created the Birth-Related Neurological Injury
Compensation Association (NICA) to resolve claims arising out of birth-related
neurological injuries. See The Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Com-
pensation Association, What is NICA?, http://www.nica.com/what-is-nica.html
(last visited Apr. 27, 2008).
202. Naomi Seiler et al., Legal and Ethical Considerations in Government
Compensation Plans: A Case Study of Smallpox Immunization, 1 IND. HEALTH
L. REV. 1, 21 (2004).
203. See MARSHALL S. SHAPO, TORT AND INJURY LAW 1199-240 (2d ed.
2000). Other examples include specific types of mass-tort litigation and no-
fault automobile insurance plans. See James C. Harris, Comment, Why the
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund Proves the Case for a New Zea-
land-Style Comprehensive Social Insurance Plan in the United States, 100 NW.
U. L. REV. 1367, 1369 n.9, 1384 (2006).
204. See Amy Widman, Why Health Courts Are Unconstitutional, 27 PACE
L. REV. 55, 63 (2006).
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Although workers' compensation systems eliminate the com-
mon law remedy of negligence for workers who are injured in
the scope of their employment, they also provide an alternative
means of recovery. 205 Employers pay premiums to an insurance
company or a state fund, and when an employee is injured, the
employee receives compensation from the insurance company
or the fund.206
The push to create special "health courts" based on the
workers' compensation system to handle all medical malprac-
tice disputes is a relatively new tort reform phenomenon. 207
Health courts would be staffed by judges who are experts in the
health care field and, after hearing expert testimony, those
judges would make "binding determinations as to causation,
compensation, standards of care, and related issues."208 The pa-
tient would be eligible for compensation after the administra-
tive judge rules in his favor.209 Adoption of a health-court sys-
tem is controversial for a number of reasons, predominantly
because it proposes to funnel a large body of litigation into a
system that is separate from the conventional judicial
process. 210
Creating a no-fault compensation scheme involving a spe-
cial court to handle all medical malpractice disputes relating to
the use of VHPs is probably less controversial than adopting a
health-court system to handle all medical malpractice litiga-
tion. First, potential claims against VHPs would likely
205. See, e.g., Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 677 (Utah 1985).
206. See, e.g., Robin Jean Davis & Louis J. Palmer, Jr., Workers' Compen-
sation Litigation in West Virginia: Assessing the Impact of the Role of Liberali-
ty and the Need for Fiscal Reform, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 43, 52 n.46 (2004) (de-
scribing three sources of funding for workers' compensation systems today).
207. Congress, in 2005, introduced the Fair and Reliable Medical Justice
Act to fund health court pilot projects. See S. 1337, 109th Cong. §§ 2-3 (2005).
Twenty states already have screening panels that assess the validity of mal-
practice claims. Catherine T. Struve, Improving the Medical Malpractice Liti-
gation Process, 23 HEALTH AFF. 33, 35 (2004). These panels, however, provide
no liability limitations for health practitioners and have been criticized on
several grounds. See Marlynn Wei, Note, Doctors, Apologies, and the Law: An
Analysis and Critique of Apology Laws, 40 J. HEALTH L. 107, 156 (2007) (not-
ing that screening panels have "added another layer of bureaucracy, exacer-
bated the cost of litigation, and contributed to more delays").
208. Widman, supra note 204, at 58.
209. See id. at 61.
210. Cf. Paul J. Barringer, III, A New Prescription for America's Medical
Liability System, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POLy 235, 250 (2006) (explaining
that personal injury lawyers oppose administrative health courts as a "threat
to the status quo").
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represent a small subset of all medical malpractice litigation. 211
Adoption of a special court to resolve these claims would proba-
bly not prompt widespread criticism on the level of that created
by a proposed health-court system for all malpractice litigation.
Second, plaintiffs would have a reliable means of recovery, yet
liability concerns would be minimal because punitive damages
are traditionally not available in a no-fault compensation
scheme. 212 Finally, creating a special court to administer a no-
fault compensation scheme to resolve malpractice claims aris-
ing out of treatment by VHPs would not likely involve signifi-
cant administrative oversight. 213
Although creating a special court to administer a no-fault
compensation scheme is an option for states considering adopt-
ing the UEVHPA, a number of factors suggest that it may not
be the most viable alternative. Many of the issues inherent in
the use of a victim compensation fund, such as who should pay
into the fund and how large the fund should be, would also
arise if states were to create a special court to administer a no-
fault compensation scheme. State legislatures may be wary of
creating a special court to resolve medical malpractice disputes
involving VHPs because there are few working models of medi-
cal malpractice courts. 214 Additionally, although the special
court would only need to be utilized rarely, its creation would
still involve substantial set-up costs. Administrative costs could
rise if the use of VHPs is encouraged and injured parties file
more claims as a result of their use.
In sum, creating a victim compensation fund or a special
court to administer a no-fault compensation scheme are rea-
sonable alternatives to eliminating a victim's means of recovery
under section 11 of the UEVHPA but may not be the most via-
ble alternatives available to state legislatures. In the following
Part, this Note argues that states should instead assume liabil-
211. Cf. UNIF. EMERGENCY VOLUNTEER HEALTH PRACTITIONERS ACT pre-
fatory note 7 (2007) (noting a lack of data on claims against VHPs).
212. See Victor E. Schwartz & Rochelle M. Tedesco, The Re-Emergence of
"Super Strict" Liability: Slaying the Dragon Again, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 917, 932
(2003).
213. Cf. Widman, supra note 204, at 59 (describing the significant role ex-
perts will play under an administrative-health-court model, and suggesting
that decisions would be subject to the arbitrary and capricious standard of re-
view).
214. See Common Good, Frequently Asked Questions About Health Courts,
http://cgood.org/f-healthcourtsfaq.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2008) (noting that
advocates of health courts are still in the process of developing a conceptual
proposal for a health court system).
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ity for the negligence of VHPs, which would limit the civil lia-
bility of VHPs while still providing victims a means of obtain-
ing redress.
IV. STATE ASSUMPTION OF LIABILITY FOR THE
NEGLIGENCE OF VHPS
In the past, governments have "enjoyed near absolute pro-
tection-or sovereign immunity-for most types of suits for
damages."215 Many governments, however, have waived im-
munity under tort claims acts and have allowed individuals to
sue the government in certain limited situations. 216 For exam-
ple, in 1976, the United States launched a campaign to vacci-
nate the nation against Swine Flu.2 17 When individuals later
developed complications from the vaccine, the federal govern-
ment immunized vaccine manufacturers and assumed liability
under the Federal Tort Claims Act for all claims arising out of
Swine Flu vaccinations. 218 Additionally, states have waived so-
vereign immunity in situations involving the negligence of
county officers, agents, and employees. 21 9 In general, a state is
vicariously liable for the acts of its employees through the doc-
trine of respondeat superior. 220
Neither Alternative A nor Alternative B in section 11 of the
UEVHPA provides that the state is vicariously liable for the
negligent acts of VHPs. 22' Indeed, Alternative A expressly fore-
215. De Ville, supra note 41, at 530.
216. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 131, at 1044 (5th ed. 1984). The Federal Tort Claims Act permits par-
ties to sue the United States for certain torts committed by persons acting on
behalf of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2000). Liability is li-
mited to "circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be
liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred." Id.
217. George W. Conk, Will the Post 9/11 World Be a Post-Tort World?, 112
PENN ST. L. REV. 175, 237 (2007).
218. Id. at 238.
219. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-40 (2007).
220. See Abigail Hing Wen, Suing the Sovereign's Servant: The Implica-
tions of Privatization for the Scope of Foreign Sovereign Immunities, 103 CO-
LUM. L. REV. 1538, 1566 (2003).
221. See UNIF. EMERGENCY VOLUNTEER HEALTH PRACTITIONERS ACT § 11,
Alternative A, subsec. (b), at 39 (2007) ("No person is vicariously liable for
damages for an act or omission of a volunteer health practitioner if the practi-
tioner is not liable for the damages under subsection (a)."); cf. id. § 11, Alter-
native B, at 40-41 (failing to include any provision holding states vicariously
liable for the acts of VHPs).
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closes that possibility. 222 The April 2007 Draft of the UEVHPA,
however, contained a third alternative that stated VHPs were
deemed to be agents or employees of the state while providing
services pursuant to the UEVHPA.223 Although VHPs were still
protected from negligence liability, the alternative stated that
"the state may be named as defendant and is liable for the
payment of any judgment" based upon the negligence of the
VHP.224 It also provided that no person or entity other than the
state was vicariously liable for damages arising out of a VHP's
negligence. 225 Essentially, the state would be vicariously liable
for a VHP's negligence through the doctrine of respondeat su-
perior.226 The final version of the UEVHPA, however, does not
contain state assumption of liability as an alternative.227 It is
unclear why the drafters omitted an assumption-of-liability
provision from the final version of the UEVHPA.
A. ENACTING THE ASSUMPTION-OF-LIABILITY ALTERNATIVE
Unlike establishing a fund or creating a special court,
adopting this alternative only requires the drafter substitute
language providing that the state may be named as a defen-
dant under section 11, in lieu of adopting Alternative A or Al-
ternative B. This solution is simple to enact because the drafter
of a bill to adopt the UEVHPA need only substitute the state
assumption of liability solution for Alternative A or Alternative
B in the bill introduced in the state legislature. Such language
might appear in the following model provisions:
(a) Subject to subsection (c), a volunteer health practitioner who pro-
vides health or veterinary services pursuant to this [act] is not liable
for the payment of a judgment based on an act or omission of the
practitioner in providing those services and may not be named as a
222. Id. § 11, Alternative A, subsec. (b), at 39.
223. UNIF. EMERGENCY VOLUNTEER HEALTH PRACTITIONERS ACT § 11, Al-
ternative A, subsec. (a) (Proposed Draft Apr. 2007), http://www.law.upenn.edu/
blllarchives/ulc/uiehsa/2007apr6draft.htm. This language was also included in
the comments of the final version of the Act. See UNIF. EMERGENCY VOLUN-
TEER HEALTH PRACTITIONERS ACT § 11 cmt. 4 at 46.
224. UNIF. EMERGENCY VOLUNTEER HEALTH PRACTITIONERS ACT § 11, Al-
ternative B, subsec. (a) (Proposed Draft Apr. 2007).
225. Id. § 11, Alternative B, subsec. (b).
226. Cf. Hodge, Risk Management, supra note 33, at 74 (discussing VHPs
and hospital liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior).
227. See UNIF. EMERGENCY VOLUNTEER HEALTH PRACTITIONERS ACT § 11,
at 39-41. Instead, the comments to the UEVHPA indicate that some states
may choose to provide victims a means of recovery through the assumption of
liability. Id. § 11 cmt. 4 at 46. The comments, however, do not indicate how a
state should determine whether to assume liability. See id.
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defendant in an action based on such an act or omission. However, a
volunteer health practitioner is deemed to be an agent or employee of
this state under [cite the state tort claims act] while providing health
or veterinary services pursuant to this [act], and the state may be
named as defendant and is liable for the payment of any judgment
based upon an act or omission of the practitioner as provided in [the
tort claims act].
(b) No person other than this state is vicariously liable for damages
for an act or omission of a volunteer health practitioner if the practi-
tioner is not liable for the payment of a judgment based on the act or
omission under subsection (a).
(c) This section does not limit the liability of a volunteer health prac-
titioner for:
(1) willful, wanton, grossly negligent, reckless, or criminal conduct;
(2) an intentional tort;
(3) a claim for breach of contract;
(4) a claim asserted by a host entity or by an entity located in this or
another state which employs or uses the services of the practitioner;
(5) an act or omission relating to the operation of a motor vehicle,
vessel, aircraft, or other vehicle for which this state requires the op-
erator to have a valid operator's license or to maintain liability insur-
ance, other than an ambulance or other emergency response vehicle,
vessel, or aircraft operated by the practitioner while providing health
or veterinary services or transportation pursuant to this [act].225
Essentially, this language states that VHPs function as
state employees during a public health emergency, and that the
state agrees to assume liability for their negligence. Victims
may still sue VHPs for intentional torts, and the state does not
agree to assume liability for those claims. Because the state
agrees to be named as a defendant, this language provides a
clear, alternative remedy for states whose courts have con-
strued open courts provisions as providing substantive checks
against legislative tort reform efforts. Further, from a public
policy perspective, state assumption of liability is preferable
because it avoids burdening vulnerable populations. Therefore,
this alternative is also a viable option for states whose courts
have construed open courts provisions as not providing subs-
tantive checks against tort reform.
Expanding on the language of the April 2007 draft, states
contemplating adopting the assumption-of-liability alternative
may also consider modifying this solution slightly to streamline
the litigation process, reduce the discovery burden on plaintiffs,
facilitate settlement, or conserve judicial resources. The deci-
228. UNIF. EMERGENCY VOLUNTEER HEALTH PRACTITIONERS ACT § 11, Al-
ternative B, subsecs. (a)-(c) (Proposed Draft Apr. 2007) (alteration in original).
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sion to modify the alternative solution should be governed by
knowledge of the state's judicial system, docket length, and
other judicial management systems already in place.
For example, states could include language in the bill
adopting the UEVHPA that helps judges manage pretrial dis-
covery, settlement talks, and summary judgment motions. 229
Instead of creating a special health court to hear medical mal-
practice cases or cases involving the UEVHPA, states could im-
plement 'continuing judicial education' programs that train[]
judges in case management skills and equip[] judges to assess
the qualifications of medical, statistical, and economic ex-
perts."230 Additionally, states could create a division of their
trial court system to hear cases involving the UEVHPA. Regu-
lar trial court judges could serve a rotation in the specialized
division. 231 While serving, "judges could receive special training
and would gain concentrated exposure to medical liability cas-
es. Because the judges would be elected within the general pool
of trial judges, political pressures would be reduced."232 This
system would likely be more workable in urban areas with a
plentiful pool of judges than in rural areas. 233 For states that
already mandate continuing judicial education or trial court ro-
tations, these requirements could be adopted easily. 234
States that do not already have continuing judicial educa-
tion programs or trial court divisions in place may be wary of
imposing new requirements on the judiciary until they deter-
mine how often cases involving the UEVHPA will proceed to
trial. Litigation resulting from public health emergencies or
disasters, however, will involve "a finite number of courts,
staffed by a handful of judges, with resources that are already
spread extraordinarily thin."235 Case management procedures,
including creating a trial court division to hear cases involving
229. Cf. Catherine T. Struve, Expertise and the Legal Process, in MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE AND THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 173, 175 (William M. Sage
& Rogan Kersh eds., 2006) (discussing the importance of the pretrial process,
which helps the judge "manage pretrial discovery and settlement talks and to
address motions for summary judgment").
230. Id. at 177.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See id.
235. Robert M. Pestronk et al., Public Health in Court: Who's to Judge?, 32
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 47, 49 (Special Supp. 2004) (comments of J. Shields).
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the UEVHPA, "will allow the courts and judges ... to respond
responsibly, appropriately, and efficiently."236
States should embrace the maxim that "an ounce of pre-
vention is worth a pound of cure," 237 particularly when the ben-
efits of doing so extend beyond the realm of the UEVHPA. Pub-
lic health emergencies, terrorist attacks, and other situations
implicate similar "legal and operational" issues.238 Accordingly,
states that prepare their judicial system for handling cases in-
volving the UEVHPA are more likely to be prepared for the on-
slaught of cases following natural disasters, an influenza pan-
demic, or acts of biological terrorism.
Additionally, the bill could specifically provide that judges
may use mediators during the pretrial process. "Mediation is a
confidential, voluntary process in which an impartial third par-
ty-the mediator or, at times, comediators-works with parties
in a dispute to help them negotiate a resolution to their con-
flict."2 39 Unlike binding arbitration, mediation allows partici-
pants-in this case, the state and injured plaintiffs-to discuss
all issues relevant to settlement and compensation without
triggering "the due process concerns raised by agreements for
binding arbitration."240 One benefit to using mediation to settle
after both sides "have had time to evaluate the merits of a
claim" is that it allows parties to avoid the emotional and eco-
nomic costs of discovery. 241 Mediation to facilitate settlement is
not appropriate, however, if either or both parties to a claim
lack information necessary to assess its merit and value.242
One concern pertaining to the use of mediation is that it
may "convey[] the message that litigants should settle their
cases because juries are so unpredictable and trial is a bad and
expensive process."243 This concern most commonly arises in
236. Id.
237. See, e.g., Christopher M. Grengs & Edward S. Adams, Contracting
Around Finality: Transforming Price v. Neal from Dictate to Default, 89 MINN.
L. REV. 163, 201 n.229 (2004).
238. Elisabeth Belmont et al., Emergency Preparedness, Response & Recov-
ery Checklist: Beyond the Emergency Management Plan, 37 J. HEALTH L. 503,
503 (2004).
239. Carol B. Liebman & Chris Stern Hyman, Disclosure and Fair Resolu-
tion of Adverse Events, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE U.S. HEALTH CARE
SYSTEM, supra note 229, at 191, 205.
240. Id. at 206.
241. Id. at 209.
242. See id.
243. John Lande, How Much Justice Can We Afford?: Defining the Courts'
Roles and Deciding the Appropriate Number of Trials, Settlement Signals, and
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connection with mandatory mediation because of the accompa-
nying "philosophical objections to creating barriers to trial."244
Therefore, courts could avoid sending mixed messages about
settlement by ensuring that participation in mediation is vol-
untary.
Another option available to states looking to streamline the
litigation process is the use of a medical malpractice panel to
assess the merits of claims involving the UEVHPA. Many
states use a similar process to assess the merits of all malprac-
tice cases.245 Typically, a complaint is filed with a panel, the
respondent answers, and discovery is permitted. 246 In some
states, findings by the panel are admissible in court. 247 If a liti-
gant is unhappy with the panel's decision, the claimant has the
right to proceed to trial.248 One advantage to this system is that
litigation is streamlined because the discovery process does not
crowd dockets or consume scarce judicial resources.
Similarly, states could also consider requiring potential
plaintiffs to consult a medical expert before filing suit.249 This
requirement, also called a certificate-of-merit requirement, is
intended to weed out relatively weak malpractice claims.250 Se-
venteen states currently have this requirement. 251 A lawyer for
the potential plaintiff must "certify, at or near the outset of the
suit, that a qualified expert has reviewed the claim and has
found some basis for it. The provision should be carefully de-
signed to deter flimsy claims without imposing undue burdens
on valid" claims.252 Medical malpractice panels and certificate-
of-merit requirements are attractive to states because they
"appeal to the self-regulatory preferences of the medical profes-
sion" and are relatively simple to institute.253
Other Elements Needed to Administer Justice, 2006 J. DisP. RESOL. 213, 230.
244. Id. at 248.
245. Catherine T. Struve, Doctors, the Adversary System, and Procedural
Reform in Medical Liability Litigation, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 943, 990 (2004).
246. See id. at 991 (describing state variations in medical malpractice
screening panels).
247. Id.
248. E.g., Jean A. Macchiaroli, Medical Malpractice Screening Panels: Pro-
posed Model Legislation to Cure Judicial Ills, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 181, 193
(1990).
249. See Struve, supra note 229, at 174.
250. See id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. William M. Sage, Why Are Demonstrations of Comprehensive Malprac-
tice Reform So (at All) Controversial?, 37 U. MEM. L. REV. 513, 524 (2007).
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It is possible, however, that the inclusion of such provisions
in the alternative solution may violate open courts provisions
or conflict with due process guarantees. The constitutionality of
these provisions has not yet been tested in many states that
have open courts provisions. 254 States that are considering im-
posing a certificate-of-merit requirement or instituting the use
of medical malpractice panels should gauge the constitutionali-
ty of doing so by engaging in the analysis set forth above in
Part III.
B. ASSUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE LIABILITY BY THE STATE
STRIKES THE OPTIMAL BALANCE
A number of factors suggest that this alternative solution
strikes the optimal balance between encouraging volunteerism
among VHPs and providing negligently injured victims a
means of recovery. First, the government is best suited to in-
ternalize the risk of liability in public health emergencies or
disasters and spread the cost out over all of the jurisdiction's
taxpayers. 255 Because many individuals benefit when VHPs re-
spond to a disaster, the costs incurred from a VHP's negligence
are appropriately borne by all taxpayers, not just the health
care industry and medical malpractice insurance providers.
Some elected officials may be sensitive to enacting legisla-
tion that provides that the state may be named as the only de-
fendant in a negligence action. 256 It is unlikely, however, that
the state would be exposed to a large number of suits through
vicarious liability, given the limited pool of potential plaintiffs
and relatively rare occurrence of public health disasters.257
Therefore, the state would be exposing itself to liability only on
254. See, e.g., Kelly Kotur, An Extreme Response or a Necessary Reform?
Revealing How Caps on Noneconomic Damages Actually Affect Medical Mal-
practice Victims and Malpractice Insurance Rates, 108 W. VA. L. REV. 873, 898
(2006) (explaining how West Virginia's statute capping noneconomic damages
for medical malpractice cases has yet to be constitutionally challenged).
255. Cf. Lincoln Mayer, Note, Immunity for Immunizations: Tort Liability,
Biodefense, and Bioshield II, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1753, 1774 (2007) (stating that
the government is "best suited to internalize the risks and benefits" of biode-
fense products and other situations involving the common good).
256. See Lawrence Rosenthal, A Theory of Governmental Damages Liabili-
ty: Torts, Constitutional Torts, and Takings, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 797, 832
(2007) (suggesting that elected officials will be highly sensitive to tort liabili-
ty).
257. Cf. William Lay, Note, Redefining Actionable "Subsidies" Under U.S.
Countervailing Duty Law, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1495, 1505 (1991) (indicating
that natural disasters are rare events).
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limited occasions involving few plaintiffs. Additionally, if ne-
cessary, the state could take steps to limit the amount of com-
pensation available to plaintiffs in certain instances. For exam-
ple, plaintiffs' recovery could be offset by any collateral medical
benefits, including health insurance. 258 More importantly,
plaintiffs may not be able to collect punitive damages in an ac-
tion against the state.2 59 The purposes of punitive damages are
to deter negligence and to punish tortfeasors, but those purpos-
es would not be served by awarding punitive damages against
the state. These decisions about compensation should be go-
verned, in part, by the way that courts have assessed the con-
stitutionality of tort reform efforts dealing with medical mal-
practice damage caps. 260
Second, by providing that victims may sue the government
for the negligence of VHPs, state legislatures ensure that judi-
cial review will play a role in the compensation process.26 1 One
major criticism of the September 11, 2001 Victim Compensa-
tion Fund is that it provided no mechanism for judicial review
of the Fund administrator's determinations and awards. 262 The
Fund administrator did not issue any written opinions that ex-
plained the reasoning behind the awards.263 Claimants objected
to the lack of transparency and perceived lack of fairness.264
Therefore, by allowing victims to name the state government as
the sole defendant and file suit, victims would be assured some
258. See Ackerman, supra note 181, at 144 (explaining that the Fund de-
ducted collateral source compensation from victims' total awards).
259. Notably, punitive damages are rarely awarded in medical malpractice
cases. THOMAS H. KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW
136 (2001).
260. See, e.g., Clarke v. Oregon Health Scis. Univ. 175 P.3d 418, 434 (Or.
2007); Mattos v. Thompson, 421 A.2d 190, 196 (Pa. 1980) (striking down a
state statute giving health care arbitration panels "original exclusive jurisdic-
tion" over medical malpractice claims).
261. Mayer, supra note 255, at 1772 (stating that judicial review is an "im-
portant self-correcting mechanism" in a compensation scheme).
262. See Elizabeth Berkowitz, The Problematic Role of the Special Master:
Undermining the Legitimacy of the September 11th Victim Compensation
Fund, 24 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 15 (2006).
263. Cf. Janet Cooper Alexander, Procedural Design and Terror Victim
Compensation, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 627, 634-35 (2003) (explaining that Con-
gress gave the Special Master "a blank check" to administer the Fund, and
that he was "unattached to any court").
264. See id. at 635 (noting that concerns about the Fund's procedures were
"resolved out of public view" and were not "subjected to the normal legislative
hearing process").
2008] 1963
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
procedural protection and transparency in the compensation
process.
Third, the government serves as a reliable defendant from
which negligently injured victims can recover if their claims
have merit. VHPs may not be covered by their standard mal-
practice insurance policies if they volunteer outside of their
normal jurisdiction.265 In contrast, when a state government
assumes liability, plaintiffs are guaranteed a more financially
secure defendant than a VHP without insurance.
Fourth, allowing victims to recover from the government
allows the government to reduce the number of potential plain-
tiffs in a permissible way. Unlike a victim compensation fund
or a no-fault compensation scheme administered through a spe-
cial court, a lawsuit demands that recovery be predicated on
causation because "[njegligence cases are highly dependent on
the particular facts and circumstances, as evaluated by the jury
on a case-by-case basis."266 In order to recover, plaintiffs would
have to demonstrate that their injury was caused by a VHP's
negligence. This fault-based determination allows states to
avoid the crippling financial task of compensating all victims of
natural disasters and public health emergencies. 267 This alter-
native also relieves states from having to determine which dis-
aster victims merit recovery through a fund.
Unless victims have a cause of action to sue they will prob-
ably not be compensated for their injuries through any other
mechanism. As stated above, those injured individuals are like-
ly to be vulnerable and already forced to bear a disproportio-
nate share of the burden after a disaster.268 Accordingly, with-
out a cause of action to sue for the negligence of VHPs, victims
will be unable to make themselves whole.
In sum, the assumption of negligence liability by the state
strikes the optimal balance between the needs of victims and
the needs of volunteers. It promotes volunteerism among VHPs
by limiting their liability for negligence. It provides negligently
injured victims with a reliable means of obtaining redress. As-
265. See De Ville, supra note 41, at 530 (noting that clinicians worry that
their medical malpractice insurance policies do not cover them outside of ju-
risdictions in which they are licensed).
266. Weeks, supra note 25, at 286.
267. Cf. Meyer, supra note 196 (discussing the difficulties in compensating
victims of natural disasters).
268. See, e.g., BRASCH, supra note 174, at 13-14 (explaining how the "im-
poverished and disadvantaged" endured unsanitary conditions in the imme-
diate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina).
1964 [92:1924
OPEN COURTS ANALYSIS
sumption of negligence liability by the state also provides vul-
nerable individuals who are the most likely to be negligently
injured while receiving care from a VHP with an adequate and
reasonable remedy.
CONCLUSION
The UEVHPA represents one attempt to authorize and re-
gulate the deployment of VHPs in response to disasters and
public health emergencies. By limiting the civil liability of
VHPs for negligence, the UEVHPA attempts to balance the
need to encourage volunteerism and the need to provide negli-
gently injured victims with a means of obtaining redress. Even
though it eliminates a right to recover under the common law
cause of action for ordinary negligence, section 11 of the
UEVHPA does not provide an alternative remedy. Therefore, as
written, section 11 violates the open courts provisions found in
many state constitutions.
Over twenty states will consider adopting the UEVHPA in
2008. During this process, state lawmakers must carefully con-
sider the conflict between section 11 and open courts provisions
because the solutions offered by the UEVHPA will render it un-
constitutional in some states. In order to comply with open
courts provisions, when drafting legislation to adopt the
UEVHPA, enacting state legislatures should adopt an alterna-
tive to section 11 that limits the civil liability of VHPs and yet
still provides a remedy for negligently injured victims. Public
policy concerns also suggest that state legislatures should
adopt the UEVHPA with significant changes to section 11 to
protect vulnerable populations. The assumption of liability by
the state for the negligence of VHPs strikes a balance that
promotes volunteerism and provides an alternative remedy for
victims.
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